1.
Two Models.
A defining characteristic of the disability rights movement is a particular explanation of the disadvantages experienced by disabled people. Disadvantages are explained as effects not of biomedical conditions of individuals, but rather of the socially created environment that is shared by disabled and nondisabled people. This environment (it is said) is so constructed that nondisabled people are privileged and disabled people penalized. Disability is a social problem that involves the discriminatory barriers that bar some people but not others from the goods that society has to offer. The reader may consider the Social and Medical Models to present a false dichotomy, each attending to only one aspect of disability. This may be true, but I will make no attempt to work a conciliation here. Academic attention to the problem of disability is barely a decade old. The hopes for a global theory of disability are even dimmer than the hopes for global theories of race or gender. The disability rights movement, like the civil rights movements for women and for "racial" minorities, will require significant retooling of our conceptual categories. A decade is not enough. 1 The Medical and Social Models of disability are ideological, as explanations of social disadvantage often are. 2 My claim that they are ideological amounts to the following: Each
Model presents an account of the causal relations that hold between disability and other phenomena. The causal accounts look at first like other causal explanations -like the gravitational explanation of the tides, for example. The causal accounts involve or entail the identification of various phenomena as natural or unnatural, and as inevitable or contingent and changeable. On closer inspection it can be discovered that the contrasting causal accounts of the same phenomenon (here disability) serve and harm the interests of different groups of people. A causal account that depicts a social phenomenon as natural and inevitable (or changeable only at great cost) works to the advantage of the people who benefit from the phenomenon, and to the harm of the people who are hurt by the phenomenon. When the same phenomenon is depicted as artificial and changeable, the reformist interests of those harmed by the phenomenon are served.
My goal in this paper is not to argue for the correctness of the Social Model. Rather, I will show that important bioethical discussions presuppose its falseness, and assume the correctness of the Medical Model. This unexamined assumption produces a bias within the practice of biomedical ethics against the goals of the disability rights movement.
2.
Disability and QOL: The Standard View.
The Standard View is that disabilities have very strong negative impacts on the qualities of life of the individuals that have them. This view is widely held by nondisabled people, both in popular and in academic culture. The Standard View is confronted by a fact that I will term its Anomaly: when asked about the quality of their own lives disabled people report a quality only slightly lower than that reported by nondisabled people, and much higher than that projected by Many factors are commonly assumed to lower one's QOL. Poverty, the loss or the lack of loving relationships, thwarted ambitions and frustrated hopes are all assumed to reduce QOL. Some of these are contingently related to disability, as they are to other causes. But disability itself holds a privileged position in the catalog of QOLreducers. The life-badness that is assumed to follow from disability goes beyond the badness that comes from the partial and contingent associations that disability has with loss of love, loss of income, etc., etc. In other words, disability is conceived to have a surplus badness, over and above its specific and identifiable affects. It is assumed to be categorically bad, bad beyond its contingent effects, bad to the bone, butt-ugly bad. I will argue that the surplus badness attributed to disability comes not from a rational appreciation of the consequences of disability itself, but from the stigma that disability carries both in popular and in academic culture. In other words, the Standard View is an expression of the stigma of disability. It is not (as it presents itself) an estimate of the objective consequences of impairments.
I am interested in the Standard View for three reasons, two of them specific and one generic. The first reason is that the Standard View generally devalues the lives of disabled people. It enforces the "pity" aspects of the Medical Model that disability rights advocates find so objectionable, and thereby obscures the civil rights basis of the disability rights movement.
The second reason is that under certain theories of health care rationing, the supposed low QOL of disabled people can imply that they have less claim on health care than nondisabled people do.
This is a concrete example of harm that the Standard View can cause. The third, generic, reason is that the Standard View is well integrated within the literature of biomedical ethics. Its flaws are reflected in a wide range of philosophical discussions of disability.
But isn't the Standard View refuted by its Anomaly? Hardly anyone thinks so.
Disabilities are so stigmatized that reports to the contrary from the stigmatized group itself are almost universally discredited or ignored. (Daniels 1981 (Daniels , 1985 . Brock then argues that a "normal" wide opportunity range is a necessary condition for a high quality of life (Brock 1993 (Brock , 1995 (Brock , 2000 show a wide range of variation, too wide for a supposed "normal range" to be neatly designated.
Fourth, genetic studies of various kinds indicate enough genetic diversity in humans and most other species to allow a wide range of function, even ignoring the developmental plasticity that allows identical genotypes to divergently adapt into distinct phenotypes. Functional uniformity may be Henry Ford's ideal of industrial mass production, but it is not a scientific discovery about the biological world.
On my view, Boorse's reified concept of normal function can be compared to the historically reified concept of race. In years past the dominant scientific view was that the traditionally named human races (Caucasian, Negroid, etc.) designated biologically real categories of humans. This view has been abandoned; racial categories no longer have scientific validity. This is not to say that human variation does not exist. Of course it does, and some of the variation (hair color and texture, etc.) is statistically correlated with the traditionally named races. But when we take all human variation into account, the distribution of variation does not match the races. The naming of races was a social and economic phenomenon that simply did not match up with biological facts. The same (I say) is true of the normal/abnormal distinction. There is a great range of functional variation among humans, as among the members of any species. The variation is so great, and so multidimensional, that the belief in an objective dividing line between normal and abnormal is just as scientifically untenable as a dividing line between Caucasian and Negroid. Biology shows us that we must learn to deal with variation on its own terms, and resist the temptation to prematurely categorize. History shows us that premature biological categories sprout constantly from social prejudices about the "true natures"
of human beings. When I say that race and biological normality are reified, I mean that they are falsely conceived to reflect real, objective aspects of the natural world, determinable by biological science. Instead they reflect social strategies for the management of human diversity.
Critique of the Dependence of Opportunity on Normality (Daniels)
So I doubt the scientific basis of "normal function" from the start. But I will consider the subsequent steps on their own terms, and set aside my skepticism about normal function. unusual functional modes necessarily reduce one's opportunity is itself a manifestation of that stigma (Silvers 1998 ). The very purpose of the ADA is to remove the barriers to opportunity that disadvantage these "abnormals." To assume that "normal opportunity range" is available only to a certain narrow range of body types is to assume that the Social Model is false and the ADA fruitless. The notion that discriminatory barriers to opportunity are unavoidable facts of nature is no more justified in the case of disability than it would be for race and sex discrimination.
To be sure, a philosopher could cleverly define "opportunity" so narrowly that certain impairments limit them by definition --complete paraplegics by definition do not have the "opportunity" to walk or blind people to see. But the same trivialization could be applied to sex and race. African Americans lack the "opportunity" to be white, and women the "opportunity" to sire children. But this is just obfuscation. Whether or any of these "lacks" (non-whiteness, nonsiring, non-walking, non-seeing) restricts employment, the freedom to live where one chooses, and social status depends on the social structures in which they are embedded. The assumed "naturalness" of the linkage of normality to opportunity harms the interests of disabled people, just as the linkage of race and sex to opportunity has been harmful to other disadvantaged groups. The claim by disability rights advocates that they are being unfairly discriminated against must be met head on. The notion that opportunity is by definition out of the reach of disabled people is rightly rejected by them, just as the same claims were rejected by women or minorities.
6.
The Standard View and "Objective" Quality of Life (Brock) . Brock offers no data of this sort. The language of the ADA makes a semantic link only between disability and limitations, not between limitations and reduced QOL. Brock is assuming some additional conceptual connection. I suggest that this conceptual connection is the Boorse/Daniels linkage between biological normality and "normal" opportunity discussed above.
With the right kind of philosophical account, empirical evidence can appear irrelevant. 3 In order to explain the Anomaly (and by the way protect the Standard View from refutation) Brock distinguishes between subjective and objective QOL. Subjective QOL is how happy or satisfied one is with one's life. Objective QOL is how well one's life is really going.
"To be satisfied or happy with getting much less from life, because one has come to expect much less, is still to get less from life or to have a less good life" (Brock 1993 shows that logic alone does not prohibit a third-person judgment of QOL that differs from the judgment of the subject. But something more than logic is needed to warrant specific judgments.
How are we to separate the judgments that are objectively grounded from those that merely express one's prejudices? Separating the wheat from the chaff requires more than logic. It requires epistemology.
The Happy Slave case is effective because its epistemological credentials are built into the case. We (the third-person judges) can understand a slave's failure recognize an injustice or a social alternative that outside observers (like us) can perceive. We recognize oppression, and the possibilities of liberation, in ways that slaves and women in sexually oppressive societies do not.
Our superior knowledge allows us to trump their subjective judgments with our objective ones.
But not all judgments are made from such high epistemic vantage points. The epistemics of the Happy Slave case cannot be extrapolated to every other case in which we want to pass judgment on someone else's life.
Take, for example, the Anomaly. The disabled subjects in these studies know full well their own impairments. They are able to describe in detail the day to day difficulties that they can cause, and they realize (sometimes with amusement) that nondisabled people assume them to have a low QOL (Albrecht and Devlieger 1999). Many acquired their impairments late in life, and so had lived both with and without impairments. The Standard View is very widespread. Is that because of the superior knowledge of nondisabled people about the lives of disabled people? Or is it merely a reflection of the stigma of disability? The Happy Slave has nothing to tell us. The fact that we can trump subjective QOL judgments with judgments that we believe are objective does not mean that we are correct when we do so. When our "objective" judgments happen to match our own social prejudices, that coincidence alone should make us wary about our own objectivity. The Happy Slave example gives no epistemological support to Brock's judgment that he knows better than disabled people about their QOL. In the absence of a genuine epistemological basis, it's just a conflict between subjectivities.
Nevertheless, the mere coherence of the objective/subjective distinction does leave open the possibility that a legitimate epistemological basis might be found for an objective assessment of the QOL of disabled people. Considerations below will lead us further in that direction.
Penalizing Health Care Priorities by QOL.
This section will discuss one application of the Standard View of disability and QOL to health care policy. The particular application is not one that the philosophers so far discussed This section will discuss one particular justification of the policy of health care priority penalization for disabled people. I will term this the Menzel Criterion because of its expression in a paper by Paul T. Menzel, though he may not endorse this use (Menzel 1992 ). 4 The Menzel
Criterion states roughly that priority considerations that are applied to nondisabled people can be justly applied to disabled people as well. A criterion would only be unjust if it were applied to disabled people but never applied to nondisabled people. This is a very weak criterion, in that a policy that satisfies it may be unjust in many other ways.
I do not believe that priority penalization satisfies even this weak criterion, but it fails in an interesting way. The failure is revealing about the Standard View. Here is how the Menzel
Criterion would apply to QALY priority penalization of disabled people.
Let us use the term "discrimination" in a morally neutral sense, so that some cases are just and some are unjust. Unjust cases of discrimination are those in which it is directed against a member of a "protected class," a class of people against whom discrimination has been applied for social reasons unrelated to the legitimate goals of a practice. If one is hiring a carpenter, discrimination against people who are unskilled carpenters is not unjust. This is true even if the unskilled carpenter happens to be a woman, a member of a protected class. It is unjust to refuse to hire the woman only if her sex rather than her carpentry skill was the basis of the decision not to hire. An employer could defend against a complaint of unjust hiring practices by showing that other women with higher carpentry skills were hired, and that men who had skills comparable to the complainant were not hired. This would demonstrate that discrimination was based on skill level rather than protected class membership, and so was not unjust.
Health care discrimination might be defended in the same way. Suppose a member of an ethnic minority were refused a heart transplant on the grounds that the operation had a low probability of success. Suppose the decision were challenged as unfair discrimination against an ethnic minority. The decision could be defended by showing that other members of the minority whose probability of success were higher did receive the procedure, and non-minority patients whose probabilities of success were similar to the patient's were also refused the procedure.
Consider disability in place of minority status. If some feature X that happens to correlate with disability reduces a patient's ranking in health care prioritization, but the priority judgments are made on the basis of feature X and not on the disability status per se, then it could be argued that the discrimination is just (if discriminations on the basis of X are otherwise just). Evidence that the priority rankings were based on X rather than on disability could come from that fact that that the use of the "objective" measure of opportunity range in the priority penalization of disabled peoples' health care fails to satisfy the Menzel Criterion. It does not apply equally to disabled and nondisabled citizens. Opportunity loss is a smoke screen hiding the real grounds for discrimination --the stigma attached to disability itself. Opportunity losses could only be socially accepted as justifications for priority-penalization if they are sustained by disabled people. This practice does indeed discriminate unfairly against people with disabilities --it discriminates against them only because they are disabled.
I must repeat that the Menzel Criterion is a very weak criterion of justice, and social policies that pass it might well fail on other grounds. Even this low hurdle is too high for the policy of QALY priority penalization for disabled people. 5 I will now discuss one higher hurdle, a hurdle that I believe would block priority penalization for disabled people even if we were to change our minds, and decide that to apply QOL equally to people with equally low QOL. This criterion would disallow practices that perpetuate an existing injustice, even if they did so in a way that satisfied the Menzel Criterion.
9.
Just and Unjust QOL Reduction.
One problematic feature of QALY criteria for prioritization is that they are insensitive to the causes of reduced QOL. Intuitively, one might think that unjust reductions in life quality might receive a different treatment than just ones. Perhaps a naïve assumption is being made that all of the influences on QOL are matters of fortune, undeserved by the recipient but not unjust.
But suppose that reduced QOL arises from social oppression. If we use opportunity range as the operationalization of QOL, it would be easy to argue that women and African Americans have significantly lower opportunity ranges in the U.S. with respect both to employment and freedom from harassment. Could these very real opportunity losses be used to justify reduction in health care priority? I seriously doubt it --at least not without strong resistance from the affected groups.
Why haven't QOL reductions been discussed as a factor in health care prioritization for nondisabled people? I suspect that it is because opportunity loss due to sex and race is seen as unrelated to health care, while the same reductions are seen as a health care issue when they coincide with disability. This is simply another begging of the question in favor of the Medical Model and against the Social Model of disability. According to the Social Model, the opportunities lost to disabled people are taken away by unjust and discriminatory social barriers, not by biomedical conditions. Similar social barriers disadvantage women and racial minorities. If we are unwilling to penalize women and racial minorities for the QOL consequences of the discrimination they experience, it is unjust to penalize disabled people for the same consequences. I submit that a policy of priority penalization for people whose low QOL stems from social oppression could not be socially negotiated. (Surely the wretched medical treatment of slaves in the American South prior to emancipation is in no way excused because they had a low QOL anyway.) I further submit that a policy of priority-penalization based on "objective" factors such as reduced opportunity ranges could not be negotiated so long as it was applied without discrimination. For these reasons, I conclude that the application of these penalties to disabled people is based only on their stigmatized status, and not on their alleged low QOL. 6 The outcome of this discussion is not entirely negative. Notice that I have been comparing objective QOL measures of both disabled and nondisabled people. I have not been relying on subjective reports alone. This opens the possibility for an empirically grounded and epistemologically respectable comparison of disabled and nondisabled QOL. Such a comparison might replace the subjective (nondisabled person's) intuition that disability must reduce QOL.
Some details about the subjective QOL reports of disabled people (the Anomaly) will suggest some possible avenues of study.
Details of the Anomaly
Let us now consider some details of the various surveys relating to the QOL of disabled people. One pair of correlations is especially interesting (Fuhrer et al. 1992 Organization (WHO) used to label "handicap." (The WHO has since revised this vocabulary, but I will retain it because it was used in the cited research. 7 ) WHO handicap refers to the extent to which a disabled person is able to fulfill the social roles that are considered normal for the person's age, gender, and culture. Aspects of handicap that were measured in these studies included reduced social integration, reduced "occupation" (spending time in ways typical of one's peers, as in employment or homemaking) and reduced mobility. As we saw in the discussion of the HSI above, mobility is not a characteristic of an individual. Rather it is the interactive effect of a person's physical abilities and the environment in which the person lives.
As seen in the case of the three sisters, WHO handicaps vary greatly among people with identical impairments.
The correlation of reported QOL with WHO handicap rather than degree of impairment shows that the self-perceptions of disabled people are not reflected in the Standard View.
Subjective QOL did not track the degree of the person's impairment ("abnormality"), but rather the accessibility of their environment whatever their impairment happened to be. People who were unable to occupy themselves appropriately, to maintain social contacts, and to move about in their community had a lower QOL. People who were able to do these things had higher QOL. Perhaps we can make epistemologically sound judgments about the QOL of disabled people after all! We need not rely on intuitive conceptual connections between disability and low QOL --we can study the patterns of correlation between impairments and the objective correlates of QOL.
If the factors that relate to high and low QOL are really the same for disabled and nondisabled people, then one way of making an objective assessment of QOL of disabled people is to measure those correlates. Here we can actually find evidence of a lower QOL for disabled people. Consider QOL-lowering factors like unemployment, isolation, and being a crime victim.
Disabled people score significantly higher than nondisabled people do on these factors. These are demographic facts, not philosophical intuitions or implications of "our concepts." Wouldn't these empirically measurable facts serve the biomedical ethicists better than conceptual analysis in proving the inherent superiority of the normal?
In fact I believe they would not. When we get down to actual causes of disadvantage, and
we study them in a way that allows unbiased empirical comparison between disabled and nondisabled people, the social causes become more apparent. Each of the demographic QOLlowering factors that applies to disabled people at a higher rate than nondisabled people does so for social reasons. The impact of the Social Model is much clearer when we attend to specifics than when we abstractly think of reified abnormality as a person-type. For example, consider crime victimization. Disabled people are no more responsible for the crimes committed against them than are the victims of rapes; victimhood is no more essentially tied to disability than it is to womanhood. Consider unemployment and isolation. An important cause of unemployment and isolation is the lack of suitable transportation. This fact is true for disabled and nondisabled people alike. A wheelchair user in a town with wheelchair inaccessible transportation is in a very similar position to a nondisabled person in a location that has no transportation. Neither can hold down a job, and each has limited social contacts.
Certain customary ways of talking disguise the fact that disabled and nondisabled people alike share the problem of transportation. Our bioethicists (and others) often label transportation that is accessible to disabled people as "special transportation." This label is merely one more way of stigmatizing disability, by falsely making it appear that "abnormal" people have different needs than "normal" people. Everyone needs transportation. No one needs special transportation! (Are racially integrated lunch counters special lunch counters?) When we look at the details, we see shared social problems. For these demographic facts to support the bioethical endorsement of normality, the bioethicists would have to argue that the Social Model is wrong and the Medical Model is right, that transportation is a different thing for disabled and nondisabled citizens. This is much harder to do when we attend to the actual causes in the world than when we assume it as an aspect of "our concept."
The Social Model of disability is not familiar to most disabled people who are not academics or activists. Nevertheless their QOL reports indicate no correlation of low QOL to degree of impairment, and a positive correlation of low QOL with exactly those things that cause low QOL among nondisabled people. Life quality is best explained not by the disabled person's degree of "normality" but by environmental accessibility.
Conclusion
The Medical Model of disability and the Standard View of the low QOL of disabled people are shared by popular and academic culture. Biomedical discourse assumes that the disadvantages of disability are intrinsic to the disabled state itself, and abnormality is penalized by nature itself. To the contrary I have argued that 1) low QOL is less typical of disability than popularly perceived, 2) philosophical arguments to the contrary are uncompelling in the face of the Social Model,
3) the moderate lowering of QOL that is actually experienced by disabled people is more likely due to discriminatory treatment than to any intrinsic feature of disability, 4) the use of low QOL to discriminate against disabled people in health care prioritization is unjust unless nondisabled people are treated in the same ways according to criteria that can apply to both, but that 5) the nondisabled public would never tolerate this treatment for themselves, 6) a truly objective and demographic study of low QOL among disabled people would show that it is caused by the same factors that cause low QOL among nondisabled people, 7) these factors are not essentially tied to impairment or abnormality but follow from social arrangements, and Model, and to think of the range of impairments along the lines we now think of race and gender.
That argument must be given elsewhere. But I will end with two observations that I consider relevant to the question. First, less than a century ago race and sex were themselves considered by the scientific community to be literally disabling. It was not a simple scientific discovery but a social change that gave rise to modern egalitarianism regarding sex and race. Disability activists envision a similar social change for disability itself. It will require a change in "our concept of a good life," but a change no greater than those that have already happened regarding race and sex.
Finally, many bioethicists express a widespread but utopian hope that medical advances can wipe out or drastically reduce impairments (" … we are committed to the judgment that in the future the world should not include so many disabilities …" Buchanan et al., p. 278). This vision is misplaced. Medical science does more than repair and prevent impairments. It also allows people to survive while living with impairments. A simple example is the fact that a person newly quadriplegic from spinal cord injury had a life expectancy of less than a year prior to World War II. Today the same person's life expectancy approaches that of an unimpaired person. The demographic consequence is that quadriplegics are a larger proportion of the population today than fifty years ago, and the same applies to many other impairments. Greater numbers of increasingly "abnormal" people are living among us, and the trend will continue.
This spectacular achievement goes unnoticed by the biomedical advocates of normality. Despite the utopian rhetoric one sometimes hears from some enthusiasts of the Human Genome Project, tomorrow's world will contain a greater proportion of people with impairments than today's. The social movement for the civil rights of disabled people will certainly continue. It will not be rendered moot by idealistic dreams of biological perfection. Here is a brief explanation of why I intend neither to defend the Social Model nor to work a compromise between the models. The Medical/Social contrast is a kind of nature/nurture debate. When a modest advocate of the importance of nurture finds herself debating an extreme genetic determinist, her best tactic may be simply to try to prove that the genetic determinist has not taken social causes into account. She need not present an entire theory of the interplay of nature and nurture in order to successfully demonstrate that her adversary has failed to take account of nurture. I consider the Medical Model to be so dominant and so determinist that my only ambition is to convince the reader that an important perspective is being ignored. If it sounds to the reader as if I consider biology irrelevant to disability, that appearance is a byproduct of my tactic.
